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Abstract
After the War of 1812 and the Napoleonic Wars, South American privateering in Baltimore took
on a new dimension. Technically, the United States remained neutral with Spain in the face of
Latin American revolution. However, Baltimore remained an area where privateering on foreign
commissions was common. This paper puts privateering in 1817 in the context of international
and national affairs. The Santa Maria involved pirates and what was considered a bona fide
purchaser in a prize court. Included in the paper are historical backgrounds of the key players
involved as well as a legal analysis of the issues brought up in The Santa Maria and related cases.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The privateer Patriota, outfitted on Fells Point in Baltimore, Maryland, captured the
Santa Maria off the coast of Cuba in 1817. 1 Captained by William Joseph Stafford, the Patriota
departed Baltimore on an illegal pirate cruise, taking the Spanish owned Santa Maria and her
cargo. 2 In direct contradiction to neutrality laws, the Patriota took its prize to Galveston, Texas
to sell the cargo. 3 The Supreme Court decided The Santa Maria in 1822. 4 The five years in
between the Patriota’s departure from Baltimore and the final disposition of the case, a variety
of events occurred nationally and internationally: a new system of privateering developed, the
United States gingerly maintained neutrality with Spain, U.S. forces invaded Florida, and
America’s first economic depression hit. The Court decided The Santa Maria against this
backdrop. Justice Livingston relied on witness statements and circumstantial evidence to
conclude that the original Spanish owners were the rightful owners of the sugar cargo from the
Santa Maria. 5
II. BACKGROUND
In the 18th and 19th centuries, wars were fought and won largely due to naval prowess on
the high seas. 6 However, alongside the naval vessels, another naval force worked to make a
significant difference on the outcome of the war, these were the privateers. 7 Privateers, a term
used to describe both the ship and the person, were commercial raiders that captured opposing
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merchant ships and took them to prize court where they could reap the monetary reward of their
capture. 8 During wartime, a private vessel could secure something called a commission or a
letter of marque that would constitute the vessel as a privateer. 9 The letter of marque allowed the
ship to legally capture enemy ships and take them to prize court. 10 The letter of marque, issued
by the federal government, differentiated the privateer from a pirate cruising the seas looking for
plunder. 11 The lure of making a fortune on the high seas inspired many men to go privateering,
but in reality, much of the privateering was unprofitable. However, this did not stop the few
successful commissions from inspiring scores of men to try their luck. 12
The height of privateering came during the War of 1812 and the Napoleonic Wars. The
U.S. Navy seized fifteen British warships, and privateers seized three, but when it came to
British merchant ships, privateers took approximately twenty-five hundred. 13 These numbers are
indicative of the important role that privateers played in the landscape of war, and how their
influence could dramatically affect resources. Although the most famous privateering
adventurers were during the War of 1812, privateering remained a useful wartime supplement up
through the Civil War. 14
A. SPANISH NEUTRALITY
To fully understand privateering from 1815-1820, it is important to look at national and
international affairs and place the privateers in that context. Although the War of 1812 was
officially over, the United States remained a key player in international politics. In the face of
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Latin American revolution, the U.S. maintained difficult neutrality with Spain. 15 Not far
removed from the American Revolution, many Americans supported Latin American
independence. However, American neutrality laws made it inappropriate to officially recognize
rebellions against Spain. 16 United States policy-makers dealt with the fear that supporting Latin
American rebellion could cause Spain to go to war against the United States. 17 The possibility of
an international war would be catastrophic on the new nation and its cohesion. 18
The first United States legislation concerning neutrality was the Act of 1794. 19 The
Neutrality Act of 1794 did not come to fruition without discourse and disagreement as to its
construction and breadth. Federalist supporters of strict neutrality introduced the legislation in
1793. 20 In its original form, the act would outlaw selling within the United States any vessel or
goods captured from a prince or state with whom the United States was at peace. 21 The only
exception was for vessels and goods that were first carried to the territory where the captors
belonged. 22 The legislation also aimed to outlaw sales without a prior condemnation. 23
Consumer goods could be sold more easily and without a condemnation sale because it was
harder to trace them back directly to a ship. 24
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By 1794, many of the French privateers operating along the coast had been lawfully fitted
out in France and sold their prizes and cargo in American ports. 25 Section 7 of the Neutrality Act
in its original form would have changed everything and outlawed the sale of any prizes and cargo
by the British or the French in American ports. 26 Section 7 came under much scrutiny, and it
came down to a close vote in the Senate. 27 The Vice President held the tie-breaking vote and
passed the Neutrality Act as it was submitted, including Section 7. 28 The Act faced much harsher
criticism in the House, but the President and other House members urged that the legislation
should be pushed through. 29 Their worries included potential attacks by Americans on Louisiana
and Florida as well as American privateers beginning to sail against British ships. 30 In the end,
the Neutrality Act passed less than a week before the end of session, but the provision on the sale
of prizes was noticeably absent. 31
Even though the Act did not include a prize sale provision, the1794 Neutrality Act did
address privateering and punishment generally,
If any person shall within any of the ports, harbors, bays, rivers, or other waters of
the United States, fit out and arm, attempt to, or knowingly be concerned in the
finishing, fitting out or arming of any ship or vessel with intent that such ship or
vessel shall be employed in the service of any foreign prince or state to cruise or
commit hostilities upon the subjects, citizens, or property of another foreign
prince or state with which the United States is at peace, or shall issue or deliver a
commission for any aforesaid ship, shall be convicted guilty of a high
misdemeanor, and shall be fined and imprisoned at the court’s discretion. 32
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The Act discouraged the practice of privateering against neutral nations on paper, but as time
went on, more and more investors found loopholes in the language and continued funding
privateering ventures against countries like Spain and Portugal.
This Act made it a crime for any citizen of the United States acting within the territory or
jurisdiction of the United States to exercise a commission to serve a foreign prince or state in war
by land or sea. 33 The Act also made it a crime for any person, regardless of citizenship to enlist
in foreign military or privateering service in the territory of the United States. 34 Specifically,
Section 3 of the Act of 1794 forbade, “the arming or fitting out within the United States of a
foreign privateer or naval vessel knowing it to be for employment against another foreign
country with which the United States was at peace.” 35
Congress amended the Neutrality Act in 1797, changing some of the language and adding
investors and the crew of privateering vessels to the list of those who could be found guilty of a
high misdemeanor. Even with the Neutrality Act provisions, privateers continued to go after
Spanish ships in the Caribbean. Juries, especially in privateer-friendly courts like Baltimore’s,
failed to convict, and Spain continued to put pressure on the U.S. government to create stricter
neutrality laws.
Privateering in South America after the War of 1812 was considered illegal and
punishable by law, but with the United States’ ambivalent stance toward the issue, the line of
illegality blurred. 36 Officials used privateering to their advantage as a way to indirectly put
pressure on Spain. 37 Despite the language of the neutrality laws, the United States’ government
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skirted the law by denying Americans’ active participation in privateering, but refusing to
exclude rebel ships from American ports. 38 Spanish officials were up in arms about the lax
treatment of privateering, and demanded the U.S. Administration take a firmer stance on the
issue. 39
Stricter neutrality laws were bound to come into effect, especially because of pressure
from Spanish and U.S. officials. 40 On December 20, 1816, the Portuguese Minister, Correa de
Serra, urged preventative legislation. 41 Less than a week later, President Madison pointed out
that existing laws were ineffective in deterring violation of American neutrality. 42 In March of
1817, the U.S. passed the Neutrality Act of 1817. 43 The new neutrality laws kept the language of
the Act of 1794 while making it a crime to enter into the service of a foreign colony, district, or
people within United States territory. 44 This addition was designed to prevent Americans from
enlisting in the revolutionary cause by taking out privateer’s licenses from unrecognized
revolutionary authorities. 45 The 1818 Act made it impossible to argue as a defense that
“insurgent colonies” (a.k.a. the Latin American independent nations) could not be considered a
foreign prince or state. 46
Once again, the Act of 1817 kept in force the provisions of the 1794 Act, but also
provided that owners of all armed ships sailing out of the United States would enter into a bond
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with the U.S. government in double the amount of the value of vessel and cargo. 47 Customs
collectors were given the authority to detain any vessel build for warlike purposes departing the
United States. 48
In 1818, Congress added even more restrictions. The new language of the Neutrality Act
provided:
That if any person shall, within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States,
enlist or enter himself, or hire or retain another person to enlist or enter himself,
or to go beyond the limits or jurisdiction of the United States with intent to be
enlisted or entered in the service of any foreign prince, state, colony, district, or
people, as a soldier, or as a marine or seaman, on board of any vessel of war,
letter of marque, or privateer, every person so offending shall be deemed guilty of
a high misdemeanor, and shall be fined not exceeding one thousand dollars, and
be imprisoned not exceeding three years. 49
The Neutrality Act in its 1794 form left open the argument that Latin American rebel
governments were unrecognized and did not fall under any of the requirements of the neutrality
laws. 50 The Neutrality Act of 1818 included the language “of any foreign prince, state, colony,
district, or people….” 51 This would ensure that the Act covered Latin American governments
and the loopholes would be filled. The tightening of neutrality laws as well as the increase in
convictions significantly curtailed privateering in South America.
B. UNITED STATES EXPANSION INTO FLORIDA
In 1817, Spain maintained control of parts of Florida and the Gulf Coast. 52 Members of
the U.S. military, namely Andrew Jackson, advocated for U.S. forces to invade Florida and
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expand U.S. territory. 53 Described as “carefully defined neutrality,” United States’ policy-makers
wanted to deny any responsibilities for Spanish-American tensions, while putting pressure
against Spain in Florida. 54 In his first Inaugural Address on March 4, 1817, President Monroe
said, “the sentiment in the mind of every citizen is national strength” and that if the United States
continued in the direction it was going, the nation could not fail to reach its destiny. 55 The
national attitude was toward expansion even at the risk of upsetting Spain.
In 1817, this notion proved true when Sir Gregor MacGregor successfully took and
occupied Amelia Island, a small island controlled by Spain, off the northeast coast of Florida. 56
MacGregor, attracted by Latin American independence, went to Venezuela to join the
revolutionaries. 57 He received a military commission from South American to liberate East and
West Florida from the Spaniards. 58 MacGregor thought the United States would look favorably
on his campaign against Florida and began recruiting sailors, adventurers, and brawlers in
Baltimore, Charleston, and Savannah. 59 He landed on Amelia Island and the Spanish commander,
Don Francisco Morales, gave it up without a fight. 60 In that moment MacGregor possessed the
island. 61 After a number of challenges, MacGregor left the island, but Luis Aury, a figure

53

Watson, supra note 15, at 96.
Watson, supra note 15, at 96.
55
Frank L. Klingberg, The Historical Alternation of Moods in American Foreign Policy, 4
WORLD POLITICS 239, 243 (1952).
56
Richard G. Lowe, American Seizure of Amelia Island, 45 THE FLA. HIST. Q. 18 (July 1966).
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 19.
60
Id.
61
Id.
54

10

discussed later for his involvement in Galveston, landed right after and claimed it for Mexico. 62
Under Aury, Amelia Island became a base for naval assaults on Spanish shipping. 63
Senior Spanish officials recognized the likelihood that Florida would be lost without
British support, and they began trying to secure Texas, hoping for restraint on American
recognition of the Latin rebels in exchange for ceding Florida. 64 John Quincy Adams used this to
his advantage in his negotiations to get Spain to cede Florida territory to the United States. 65 At
this time, the U.S. Administration’s loyalties were torn in different directions: toward Latin
American revolution, neutrality with Spain, and increasing U.S. territory.
Apart from Amelia Island, problems erupted in Florida where an essentially selfgoverning citizenry employed methods of populist vigilantism and violence. 66 The day after
Christmas in 1817, Secretary of War John C. Calhoun ordered Major General Andrew Jackson to
cross into Spanish Florida to punish the Seminole Indians. 67 In direct opposition to earlier
foreign policy, Jackson went down to Florida and took over the few Spanish forces without much
resistance. 68 Leaving Jackson unsupervised in the South, Administrators were surprised when
instead of controlling the Seminoles and working with Spain, Jackson had the American flag
flying over Pensacola and began looking toward St. Augustine. 69 In an attempt to save foreign
relations with Spain, the Monroe Administration tried to salvage the situation, while John
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Quincy Adams used Jackson’s assault to help negotiate an even better price for Florida. 70
Officially President Monroe gave Pensacola back to Spain, but in its aftermath a host of cabinet
meetings and an official investigation of what happened in Florida went on in Washington. 71
United States’ policy-makers recognized the strength of public opinion supporting
territorial expansion and Latin American independence. They also recognized that privateers
could put pressure on Spain in a way the U.S. Navy could not. 72 Monroe and Adams continually
ignored Spanish complaints about privateering and effectively recognized the South American
rebels as legitimate, even though they did not formally sanction them with U.S. letters of
marque. 73
C. SOUTH AMERICAN PRIVATEERING GENERALLY
With no war to fight, Baltimore hosted restless privateers without commission or a
purpose. Many of them were not transitioning well into civilian life and wanted to get involved
with privateering. 74 Immediately following the Napoleonic Wars, international shipping
rebounded and privateers started to return to normal civilian life. 75 Even though privateers were
not satisfied with the lifestyle that civilian life supported, international shipping was just coming
back, and the American people did not want privateering to deter the merchant business. 76 After
spending their prize money from the War of 1812, most of the sea captains and sailors were
unemployed and looked to the South American revolutions as way to make cash fast and solve
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their money problems. 77 During the War of 1812, Baltimore was a hot bed for privateers and
along with the popularity of South American independence, privateering during the Latin
American revolutions became just as popular. 78
Privateering in 1815 differed significantly from what it had been during the Napoleonic
Wars. The problem was, at this point in time, the United States remained a neutral nation to all of
its former adversaries. As previously discussed, under the 1794 and 1797 neutrality laws, no
American was allowed to own, outfit, arm, supply, command, or sail aboard any foreign warship
that intended to commit hostilities against a nation at peace with the United States. 79
Furthermore, no one, regardless of citizenship, was allowed to outfit a privateering vessel in
United States territory. 80 Privateers faced serious ramifications because if tried for piracy, the
punishment was death. 81 Additionally, the terms of the 1795 treaty with Spain specified that the
U.S. was to treat anyone who violated American neutrality and attacked Spain as pirates. 82
Several prominent merchants traveled to Buenos Ayres (now the country of Argentina) to
support South American independence and get back in the prize game. 83 Men outfitting
privateers to sail to the Caribbean had to keep their affairs secret for fear of getting prosecuted
for the violation of American neutrality laws. 84 Baltimore merchants kept a level of secrecy
around South American privateering and developed a level of organization within the marine
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community. 85 Maintaining a system allowed respectable members of the community to remain
players in the prize game. 86 Despite, the dangerous penalties, many merchants and sea captains
took the chance to outfit privateers. However, capital investment, a problem in the War of 1812,
was an even bigger problem in 1817 Baltimore. 87 The risks were high and securing investment
was crucial; outfitting a fully equipped, armed, and provisioned privateer could run investors
$40,000. 88
Securing a commission, the only thing separating privateers from pirates, was just as
important as raising the necessary funds. Most of the Baltimore privateers received a commission
from Buenos Ayres through a network of agents and investors. 89 Getting commission from a
revolutionary country required partners in South America, usually the same set of merchants,
who would secure commissions from the revolutionary governments in exchange for an interest
in the prizes. 90 Thomas Taylor introduced the system of South American privateering to
Baltimore in 1816, and it caught on like wildfire, soon including famous names like Joseph
Almeida, John Daniels, David DeForest, and John Chase. 91 The investors and agents in South
America, particularly Buenos Ayres, formed a close circle. Most of them knew each other and
without their help, many of the privateering ventures out of Baltimore would not have come to
fruition. 92 Despite the secrecy and planning of South American privateering, a number of
Baltimore officials were crucial in making sure that their privateering friends’ interests were
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secure. 93 Some of these friends included Skinner, the postmaster, James McCulloch, collector of
the port, Judge Bland of the Federal Court, and several famous lawyers, including William
Pinkney and William Winder. 94
The South American revolutionary governments were not giving commissions out of the
kindness of their hearts, they needed the help. 95 Naval warfare of this kind was cheap for the
rebel governments because all they had to do was sign a piece of paper granting the commission,
and the privateers would do all the rest. 96 The South American revolutionaries were in need of
reinforcements and this was an economical way to get them. 97 Once the privateer had a
commission, on the way out of port all he had to do was quickly change allegiances from the
United States to the South American country that granted the commission. 98
Once the privateer was outfitted and on its way, the next obstacle was the customs
house. 99 All vessels departing for foreign ports needed to file clearance papers attesting to the
ship’s owners, master, destination, cargo, size, nationality of the crew, and any arms the ship
may be carrying. 100 Many privateers would leave port with a limited number of men and
weapons, making it appear as if they were going on a merchant mission. 101 However, once the
ship sailed down the Chesapeake Bay, it would meet up with a schooner or two that supplied the
privateer with more men and weapons. 102
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The prizes proved to be lucrative in South American privateering as a whole; however, in
the face of criminal and civil charges, captains found it difficult to enlist seamen for the
cruises. 103 Wages were hit or miss, and normally the crew on privateering cruises was only given
a small percentage of the prize money. 104 It got more difficult when the neutrality laws directed
customs officials to detain any vessels whose outfit showed “probable” hostile activity. 105 The
captain had to post an expensive bond in order for the customs officer to let them go. 106 In
response to the new laws being enforced, American citizens on the privateering cruises were
made to swear to foreign names and nationalities for added protection. 107
In order to make money, the privateers had to find a way to sell their prizes and cargo in
the United States. 108 Spanish officials in the United States were on the lookout for any goods
from privateers that could have been the product of a breach of the United States Neutrality Act
of 1818. 109 To avoid the U.S. prize courts, the privateers would go to St. Thomas, Haiti, St.
Martins, or Jamaica and meet up with the agents of the owners who would carry out the sale of
the cargo with local merchants. 110 This complicated method of getting commission, avoiding
detection, and secretly pawning off their cargo was the way privateers had to transact business in
order to realize the value of their capture. 111
D. SOUTH AMERICAN PRIZE COURTS—GALVESTON, TEXAS
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Privateers mainly went to the West Indies and off the coast of Spain to look for prizes
and were able to make use of a small number of ports in the Gulf including, Juan Griego in
northern Venezuela, Galveston, Texas, Ferdinanda on Amelia Island, and Port au Prince in Santo
Domingo; however, none of them were appropriate for major ship repairs. 112 Pirate bases had to
be remote, but they were needed as markets so pirates could get rid of their plunder. 113 They had
to be away from areas of authority, but they also needed to provide access to the market. 114
Galveston proved to be one of these places. Texas was a frontier region operating in a section of
disputed territory beyond the authority of Texas, Mexico, the United States or Spain. 115 “Piracy
thrived along the Texan coast for five years from 1815, and both Mexican and Texan traders saw
Galveston as a lucrative source of contraband, including slaves, guns, and more conventional
cargoes.” 116 Galveston was not a place where people wanted to live, but the one thing that made
it desirable was the deep-water harbor. 117 Privateers flocked to the harbor because it was
protected by a pass and could be easily defended. 118 Three privateer captains, Luis Aury, Jean
Laffite, and Pierre Laffite controlled Galveston Bay from 1816-1820. 119
Luis Michael Aury, a French sea captain, was commissioned and given command of a
naval squadron at Cartagena in August of 1815. 120 An informal organization called “The New
Orleans Associates” contacted Aury to support them in an expedition against Mexico. The
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Associates would filibuster 121, smuggle, and use outright piracy as tactics against the
Mexicans. 122
Aury arrived at Galveston on August 3, 1816 in the ship Belonia. 123 On August 8, Aury’s
other vessels appeared and the nautical disasters began. Different ships got caught on a shoal and
did not get brought into the harbor, and before getting the message of the shoal to another captain,
the Felix joined the other shipwrecked boats. 124 On August 10, the ship Malaga tried to get
through from the south and ended up on the beach. 125 Even after all of these miscues, a brig and
another ship were added to the disaster. 126 The only ships that actually survived were the Belonia
in her damaged condition and the Centinela. 127
Aury made his crew try to salvage the damaged vessels, but disgruntled with the task and
no prize money, they mutinied, shot Aury, and set fire to the Belonia. 128 They took the rest of the
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ships and took off for Haiti. 129 However, Aury’s wounds were not serious and on September 10,
Jose Manuel de Herrera, ambassador of the Mexican Republicans, joined him in Galveston. 130
The “New Orleans Associates” sent Herrera to take possession of Galveston and establish a prize
court. He was to remain with Aury as resident commissioner. 131 Herrera arrived with Henry
Perry, an ex-quartermaster of the United States Army, who brought 120 men with him. 132 On
September 13, the Mexican Republican flag was raised and Herrera issued a proclamation that
the island belonged to the Mexican Republic. 133
Jean Laffite arrived in Galveston on March 23, 1817; he noted in his diary that on April 8,
seeing that Aury had abandoned Galveston, he and his men established a new administration.
Jean Laffite left Galveston for New Orleans on April 18, and Aury went back to try to establish a
base of operations in his absence. 134 However, Pierre Laffite, Jean’s brother, convinced much of
Aury’s old crew to flip allegiances. 135 Pierre was so successful that Aury abandoned Galveston
for good renouncing his commission to govern the island. 136
Pierre and Jean Laffite’s occupation of Galveston continued from 1817-1820. Jean Lafitte,
as self-proclaimed governor of Galveston built a fortress, and at its peak, a thousand people
inhabited the island. Sea raiders went to the island to take advantage of the Laffites’ maritime
prize court and distribution of letters of marque, disregarding the fact that the Laffites’ had no
authority from any legitimate government to participate in these activities. 137 The Laffites were
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in the pay of the Spanish government as spies while preying on Spanish and English shipping.
Much of their actions were duplicitous in nature. 138
French exiles led by old Napoleonic soldiers came to Galveston in 1818, and Jean Laffite
helped them create a camp. 139 Colonel George Mason Graham, a troubleshooter for the acting
Secretary of War, James Monroe, arrived at Galveston and declared that the United States was
claiming the land and that Laffite must leave the island. 140 In September of 1818, a hurricane
destroyed the commune and many lives were lost. 141 By 1820, the United States ordered Laffite
to leave again, and this time, Jean burned his camp and sailed away leaving the island in U.S.
control. 142
III. THE SANTA MARIA
In the turmoil of Andrew Jackson invading Florida, neutrality laws changing, Laffite
taking over Galveston, and Spanish discontent, the Patriota set sail from Baltimore. The attitude
of the Court towards privateering and piracy changed over time. By 1820, Justice Story
emphasized the piracy problem that sprung up as a result of the economic restrictions imposed
by the War of 1812 and the turbulent political conditions of the Latin America independence
movements. 143 The new “republics” formed in this region provided bases for ships and crews
who looked to take advantage of the rebellious colonies and the unstable shipping conditions. 144
Justice Story spoke of the pirates as needy adventurers prowling upon the ocean, who under the
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pretext of helping the Latin American rebellions attacked the commerce of the neutral world. 145
He referred to them as being “united together by no common tie but the love of plunder.” 146
Justice Story enjoyed maritime law and the specific nature of prize cases. He wrote on the
subject extensively and outlined the procedure of prize cases in general.
After the War of 1812, the Court was in the precarious position of deciding international
cases while avoiding conferring legitimacy to revolutionary governments but recognizing the
fact that hostilities were taking place between the colonies and European nations. 147 Between
1810 and 1825, England, France, Spain, Portugal, the United States, and numerous Latin
American republics confronted each other at sea. 148
The Patriota sailed out of Baltimore with no commission at all. Based upon the lack of
convictions in the previous years to the higher conviction rates in the 1820’s, the attitude of the
Court toward these rogue missions turned from an evil that might be overlooked to barbaric acts
worthy of hanging. This shift could be due to the conclusion of the Adams-Onis Treaty and the
United States’ position internationally. By 1822, when this case was heard, the Adams-Onis
Treaty resolved the dispute over the status of Florida and the border between Spanish and U.S.
territory. 149 The treaty was ratified in 1821 and President Monroe recognized several of the
revolutionary governments in South America shortly after. 150 The diplomatic concern between
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Spain and the United States was resolved for the most part, and the tolerance toward privateering
started to decline. 151
A. BEFORE THE CAPTURE
The Patriota left Baltimore in 1817, captained by William Joseph Stafford, with twenty
men on board. 152 In order to avoid the customs house and questions about the outfitting of the
vessel, privateers generally stripped down the vessel and supplied it with means enough to go on
a merchant voyage but nothing more. 153 The ships would normally say they were going on a trip
to the U.S. northwest to account for the amount of provisions, but once out of port would stop at
a pre-arranged spot in the Chesapeake to meet up with a small schooner bringing additional men
and arms. 154 The Patriota followed this plan to perfect execution. Even though the Patriota left
port with only twenty men, at New Point Comfort, a boat, a sloop, and the schooner Jane met up
with the privateer to bring more men and weapons. 155 The boats brought muskets, pistols, sabers,
powder, ammunition, shot, and fourteen carronades: six nine-pounders, six eighteen-pounders,
and two thirty-two pounders. 156 What started out as a voyage with twenty men and no guns
turned into a pirate cruise with 112 men and fourteen guns. 157
Some men joined privateering cruises for the adventure and drunkenness, some did for
independence, and some were unknowingly forced into the situation. 158 The crew of the Patriota
was a part of the third scenario. They grew angry when they learned that Captain Stafford
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planned a pirate cruise rather than a merchant voyage. 159 One member described feeling
‘betrayed,’ and estimated that at least two-thirds of the crew felt likewise. After forty days at sea,
a full-scale mutiny erupted. 160 A standoff followed in which Captain Stafford alternated between
threatening to blow up the ship and promising his men that he would still make their fortunes. 161
After eighteen hours, Stafford won over enough men to force the others into submission.162 It
was in this vein that the crew captured the Santa Maria, a Spanish merchant ship carrying sugar
cargo.
B. LOWER COURTS
The Santa Maria was a case appealed from the Circuit Court of Maryland. 163 Originally,
the Spanish Consul brought the case on behalf of the Spanish owners of goods captured on the
high seas by the privateer Patriota. 164 The Spanish Consul alleged that the Patriota violated the
laws of neutrality when she was illegally armed and outfitted for privateering in Baltimore. 165
Burke, the claimant in the case, contended he had title of the goods as a bona fide purchaser
under a condemnation sale in a prize tribunal in “Galveztown.” 166 The District Court of
Maryland dismissed the claim and ordered the property restored to the claimant, but the Circuit
Court reversed this ruling, and the cause was brought to the Supreme Court. 167
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The evidence in the lower courts established that citizens of the United States owned the
privateer and that she was armed. 168 William Winder was the attorney for the appellant, Burke,
and David Hoffman and Robert Goodloe Harper were the attorneys for the respondent, Spanish
Consul. Justice Livingston was the Supreme Court Judge who heard the appeal. 169
The lawyers in the Santa Maria all held much esteem and frequently went against each
other in prize court cases. David Hoffman argued on behalf of the Spanish consul and remained
on the side of the original owners for much of his career. Hoffman’s lasting legacy was his
involvement in starting and developing the University of Maryland School of Law. 170 Hoffman
was a respected member of the bar and argued in front of the United States District Court and the
United States Supreme Court, focusing on admiralty, estates, collections, and insurance cases. 171
Hoffman’s contemporaries described him as self-absorbed and righteous about championing
what he thought was right regardless of the potential consequences. 172 Hoffman tried his hand at
other things besides the law, including literature. However, commentators noted that Hoffman’s
literary efforts served most effectively, “as a means to highlight his own elitist views and
growing dissatisfaction with life in America.” 173 Hoffman married the granddaughter of former
Pennsylvania Governor Thomas McKean, and served on many boards and associations in
Baltimore. 174 He went through a tumultuous period in his personal life when two of his three
children died. Hoffman traveled to England on his own to promote emigration to unsettled land

168

Id.
Id.
170
Bill Sleeman, Laws and Letters: A Detailed Examination of David Hoffman’s Life and Career,
University of Maryland Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2005-29, 3, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=680668.
171
Id. at 11.
172
Id. at 17.
173
Id. at 19.
174
Id. at 21.
169

24

in the United States. 175 Unable to secure support for his emigration plans, Hoffman returned to
the U.S. 176 He died suddenly in New York in 1854. 177
Robert Goodloe Harper also argued on the side of the Spanish Consul. He was born to a
poor, struggling couple near Fredericksburg, Virginia in 1765. 178 He joined a horse troop under
General Greene when he was only 15 years old. 179 He graduated from Princeton in 1785 and was
introduced to a lawyer who prepared him to practice law in just one year. 180 He wrote many
political pieces for newspapers, and was elected to the Legislature of South Carolina in 1794 and
the National House of Representatives where he served until 1801. 181 He married Catherine,
daughter of Charles Carroll, of Carollton, and moved to Baltimore. 182
Harper participated in the defense of Baltimore against the British in 1814, and during the
war attained the rank of Major General. 183 In 1815, he was elected to the United States Senate,
and remained an active participant. 184 He died suddenly on January 14, 1825, the day after he
argued a case in court for three hours showing no signs of any health problems. 185 By all
accounts he seemed to be in lively spirits. 186 That morning he was standing reading the
newspaper and fell, dying instantly. He left behind a wide circle of friends who respected him as
a great lawyer. 187
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William Winder is probably the most famous lawyer that Somerset County, Maryland
never knew it had. He was born on February 18, 1775, and his ancestors were among the earliest
Maryland settlers. 188 Although he is best known for his catastrophic battle at Bladensburg,
outside of the war, Winder was a highly regarded and respected lawyer. 189 Winder completed
his early education at Washington Academy in Somerset County and finished his education at
the University of Pennsylvania. 190 He studied the law alongside Roger B. Taney at the office of
Gabriel Duval, a future Supreme Court Justice. 191 He was described as having a warm, generous
nature and captivating manners, and his genteel nature secured him a high place of esteem and
affection in the community. 192 He was a Federalist in politics, and after the war, he was elected
to the State Senate twice. At the time of his death, his practice was the largest of the Baltimore
Bar and one of the largest in the United States Supreme Court. 193 His contemporaries knew him
as a deeply passionate man who learned his craft and applied the principles of the law in an
extraordinary way. 194 He died a well respected and admired lawyer, who was loved and honored
by those who got to hear his oral arguments and know him as a rival and friend. 195
C. CLAIMANT ARGUMENT
On behalf of Burke, the claimant, Winder argued that there was no proof that the goods in
question were taken out of the Santa Maria, or any other Spanish ship. 196 He insisted that even if
there was no proof from the claimant that he was a bona fide purchaser of the goods from a
188
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lawful condemnation sale, he had a right to stand on his title as an innocent purchaser, until some
better title was shown. 197
D. SPANISH CONSUL ARGUMENT
In opposition, Hoffman argued that the evidence established that the Patriota was a
privateer vessel owned and outfitted in Baltimore, and all captures made under the taint of an
illegal outfit were considered illegal. 198 Consequently, the property taken had to be restored to
the original owner. 199 The Patriota not only was a privateer illegally outfitted in Baltimore, but it
also did not have a commission from any country whatsoever. 200 In effect the Patriota was a
pirate ship. Hoffman argued that without a commission, the taking of the cargo is tortious at best
and piratical at worst. 201 He argued the burden of proving a legitimate seizure lied with the
claimant, and if no proof existed, the Court should restore the property to the Spanish owners. 202
Even though Burke claimed to hold the property as an innocent bona fide purchaser, without
knowing about the libel, Hoffman argued even if it were true, the cargo had to be returned
because it came from the spoils of a pirate voyage. 203
Hoffman formed interesting arguments in opposition of the principle of market overt that
the Court failed to address in its opinion. He argued, “no right to the spoil vess [sic] in them, no
right can be derived from them,” in other words that the tile of the claimant is not anymore
persuasive than one from the pirates themselves. 204 Essentially, he argued that the rights of a
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proven bona fide purchase would be no more than the rights of the pirates. 205 The market overt
principle was an English common law rule that when goods are sold in the market, the buyer
acquires a good title of the goods, provided that he buys them in good faith and without notice of
any defect on the part of the seller. 206 By 1457, the principle of market overt had been adopted
and was well recognized as part of English common law. 207 The burden of proof is on the
person who claims to have acquired title against the owner. 208 The sale of market overt vests it
in the purchaser, and then the conviction of the thief revests it in the true owner. 209 It would have
been an interesting argument for Winder to raise, but most likely he recognized that the principle
remained in England and did not have a basis in United States’ courts. 210
However, the argument the Court accepted was that the claimant allegedly was the active
and principal owner of the Patriota, the pirate vessel. 211 Hoffman relied on testimony from the
crewmembers on board the Patriota to make his case. 212 After the attempted mutiny, it comes as
no surprise that the crewmembers were willing to turn on the ship’s owner and testify on behalf
of the Spanish owners. Hoffman pointed out the inconsistencies in the claimant’s story. Burke
denied all knowledge of the capture of the Santa Maria and every fact stated about the business
of the Patriota, but he relied on a purchase of the property by his agent Novion, in the regular
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course of trade after the Santa Maria had been condemned. 213 Hoffman asserted that it was the
claimant’s intention to produce an authenticated record of condemnation, which was abandoned
because of the knowledge that Aury’s commission at Galveston was a nullity. 214 The tribunals at
Galveston were incompetent to adjudicate even if a condemnation of a competent court could
have prevailed. 215
E. COURT’S HOLDING AND REASONING
In Justice Livingston’s short opinion, he stated that in a case of such an obvious disregard
for the neutrality laws in fitting out and arming a privateering vessel in an American port, the
counsel for the claimant was right in not attempting to justify the capture of the Santa Maria. 216
He found that in this situation it was immaterial whether or not the ship had commission because
it was in such opposition to the law of the United States. 217 Justice Livingston relied on four
witnesses whose relation of the events was so uniform and particular that there was no doubt
about any part of the transaction. 218 Three of them were on board the Patriota at the time of her
illegal voyage, and they established the unlawful arming of the vessel in Baltimore, the capture
of the Santa Maria, and that the sugars in question were the same ones taken out of the Santa
Maria, put on the schooner Harriet, and brought to Baltimore. 219 Causter, a witness, testified that
to his knowledge, the sugars were part of the cargo of the Santa Maria, and the Court took into
account the level of detail of his story, and that the level of information was such that it was
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impossible he was mistaken. 220 With the witnesses’ statements, the court saw no reason to doubt
their stories and affirmed the sentence of the Circuit Court. 221
Even if Justice Livingston put more emphasis on the authority of the condemnation sale
at Galveston, the result would have been the same. In a Supreme Court opinion a year earlier, in
the case of cargo of two Spanish ships captured and condemned at Galveston, under the alleged
authority of the Mexican Republic, the Court ruled that it did not recognize the existence of any
admiralty court at Galveston with the authority to adjudicate captures. 222 The U.S. government
did not recognize the Mexican Republic, and the Court could not consider as legal any acts done
under the flag and commission of that republic. 223 In that case, the action was allegedly
conducted under the flag of Buenos Aires, so the case was sent back, but in The Santa Maria, the
privateer did not have a commission.224 Therefore, any condemnation sale out of Galveston
without a commission would be considered ineffective.
IV. RELATED OPINIONS
The interesting part of The Santa Maria decision is that the Court did not rule on the
substance of law question concerning the bona fide purchaser. However, in the counsel’s
arguments section, the court acknowledged that the substance of that argument is found in the
Nereyda case, where the same question arose and the same lawyers argued the facts. 225 In La
Nereyda, once again the Spanish Consul was the claimant arguing that the privateer Irresistible
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had captured a public vessel of war belonging to the king of Spain in violation of U.S. neutrality
laws. 226
The ultimate question in La Nereyda was similar to the one in the Santa Maria: whether a
regular sentence of condemnation in a court of the captor or his ally would preclude the U.S.
courts from restoring it to the original owners, where the capture was made in violation of our
laws, treaties, and neutral obligations. 227 Where an order of proof of purchase is made, it is
almost invariable practice for the claimant to make proof by his own oath of his proprietary
interest, and to explain the other circumstances of the transaction. 228 The absence of such proof
and explanation always leads to doubts.
Hoffman started counsels’ arguments for the appellant by arguing that even without
reference to proof, the captured property should be returned to the original owners because of the
breach of neutrality laws of the United States. 229 He maintained this argument in the Santa
Maria as well and did so with success. Hoffman argued that there was no sufficient proof of the
condemnation, which is relied on, and that the Court should require the exhibition of at least the
libel in order to show the grounds of the prize proceedings. 230 Hoffman argued that the
commission and the genuineness of the sale between the privateer and the South American prize
tribunal came into question. 231 The question for the court was simply whether those who have
gained possession by illegal means were permitted to retain that possession against its original
possessors, in the very country whose laws were violated. 232
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Winder on the other hand contended that the capture was made under a lawful
commission in the port of Venezuela, an ally of Jose Artegas (where the commission came from)
in the war with Spain. 233 The claimant asserted his claim as a bona fide purchaser under that
sentence of condemnation. 234 Winder argued that a valid condemnation might be pronounced in
the court of the captor’s country, where the prize was in the port of an ally. 235
After Winder’s argument, Robert Goodloe Harper argued that even if the libel was
produced, it had no effect because it came from a sentence of a court that had no jurisdiction. 236
The commission under which the prize was taken was granted by Artegas, as chief of the
Orientals, and protector of the Oriental Republic. 237 The Oriental Republic, which if it had any
such existence, was distinct from Venezuela where the condemnation sale took place. 238 Harper
denied the argument that Venezuela was an ally and that the prize court of an ally may condemn.
Artegas had possession of the Nereyda, and as it was the possession of the property by the
sovereign that gives jurisdiction to his Courts.239 The question of prize or no prize belongs
exclusively to the Courts of the captors’ country. 240 It follows that the Court of Venezuela did
not have jurisdiction to adjudicate. 241
Justice Story delivered the opinion of the Court. The claimant asserted the sale was made
after condemnation. 242 The vessel after her seizure showed that she continued to remain in the
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control, management, and direction of the ones who captured her. 243 Whoever set up a title under
a condemnation sale was bound to show that the Court had jurisdiction. 244 Justice Story made his
conclusion by looking at all of the circumstances of the case including the fact the property
remained unchanged in the possession of the captors, the habit of the vessel, the control of the
property by the privateer captain, the absence of all proper documentary proof of ownership,
instructions, disbursements, and connection with her on the part of the claimant. 245 The Court
concluded no real sale ever took place, and the property remained with the original captors,
unaffected by the asserted transfer of ownership. 246 “The positive evidence is completely borne
down by the strong and irresistible current of circumstantial evidence which opposes it.” 247
Although the actors in La Neryda went through more trouble to try to disguise the fraud in the
condemnation sale, the outcome was the same as in the Santa Maria. In the Santa Maria, the
Court found that the sugar had been illegally commandeered by the Patriota, which the claimant
had an interest in, and remained in the hands of the claimant. Similarly, in La Neryda, the
property remained unchanged in the possession of the captors, and the court decided no real sale
took place. In both cases, the court went against the Baltimore privateer and returned the prize to
the Spanish.
The case went against the claimant because of the omission of the original libel, or any
account for its non-production. The case was insufficient on the part of the claimant because no
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proof of proprietary interest existed. 248 The Court said that it was clear that the original outfit of
the privateer was illegal and the property of the Nereyda be restored to the King of Spain. 249
V. THE END OF PRIVATEERING IN THE 1820’s
In response to non-action by the United States government, Spain turned to a strategy of
using the courts against the privateers. In court, the lawyers arguing on behalf of Spain attacked
the legitimacy of the commissions and slowly started to win cases. 250 By winning cases and
getting prizes returned to Spain, using the courts proved to be a crucial tool in reducing
privateering activity. Criminal prosecutions of privateers rarely resulted in a conviction. 251
However, the Spanish consuls win rate was much higher; it focused on private claims over the
legal status of captured persons, vessels, and goods. 252 As mentioned earlier, the timing of these
suits came during a period where the U.S. was balancing tense neutrality and the government did
not want to make any firm decisions. 253 To counteract this, the Spanish consuls brought their
suits as private legal claims advanced in federal court where they could beat their enemies,
instead of beating them at international legislation. 254
The consuls were the official representatives of sovereign European powers, largely
American businessmen trying to promote their political objectives. Even though the consuls
were not necessarily trying to create good law, many of their cases reached the Supreme
Court. 255 Indirectly, the consul suits allowed the federal court to repeatedly define the nation’s
rights and obligations under treaties and law of nations to determine the sovereignty of the
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revolutionary states and identify the prohibitions that neutrality imposed on Americans who
participated in the Latin American revolutions. 256 Consuls were allowed to file a libel on behalf
of the Spanish owners because the foreign consul could claim property on behalf of his nationals
without specific authorization from the property owners. 257 The privateers claimed that the
vessels and cargo they captured were legitimate prizes of war and the federal court had no
grounds to award restitution to the owners. 258 Inevitably, the consul’s argument would be that the
capture violated the neutrality laws of the United States and the 1795 treaty between Spain and
the U.S. 259 Based upon the persistent litigation on behalf of the Spanish consuls, it seemed as if
the litigation was a political strategy to pressure privateers and their associates as fully as
possible, and they did so with much success. 260 The consuls had an almost perfect record in
Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia; even in Baltimore, consuls won 75% of the time. 261
The effect of the stricter enforcement of these neutrality laws did much to deter
privateering in the 1820’s. As a consequence of the neutrality laws, at least 129 men were
arrested for piracy during this period, and based on the records available, 31 of those men were
found guilty. 262 Of those 31, seven of them were executed for piracy. 263 Even though these seven
lost their lives, they were the only Baltimore affiliated South American privateers known to
suffer real criminal penalties. 264 Even though many of the privateers escaped death, in civil
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courts, their prizes were repeatedly given back to the original Spanish owners. 265 The crack
down in civil court ultimately made privateering in South America more risky without the
prospect of a great return. Giving back their captured goods and losing vessels deterred ship
owners from continuing to invest in privateering ventures. 266
Furthermore, the Panic of 1819 did much to reduce the investment in risky privateering
cruises. The decline of profits from privateering occurred at the same time of the Panic of 1819,
America’s first economic depression. 267 The root of the panic came form the scandal at the
Maryland Branch of the Second Bank of the United States and devastated Baltimore’s merchant
community. 268 Many prominent merchant houses had to close and wealthy men had to put their
elaborate Baltimore mansions up for sale. 269
VI. CONCLUSION
Privateering from 1815-1820 created a new set of rules in the face of international
diplomacy problems, economic disaster, and Latin American revolution. The pirate venture of
the Patriota came during a time where U.S. neutrality laws were in flux, and the U.S.
administration relied on privateers to put indirect pressure on Spanish forces. In that context, the
Supreme Court decided, in the Santa Maria and explained fully in La Nereyda, that in order to
prove oneself as a bona fide purchaser, the claimant has to show proof of the proper documents
and libel. Without such showing of proof, the prize must go back to the original owners.
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Appendix
WILLIAM JOSEPH STAFFORD
William Joseph Stafford was not only the captain of the privateer Patriota, but was also
the captain of the Dolphin during the War of 1812. By all available accounts, William Stafford
was born September 12, 1781, the oldest child born to Richard and Catharine Stafford of
Frederick County, VA. 270 He married Mary Whipple on October 1, 1805 in Baltimore. 271 They
had two children: William Whipple Stafford and Francis Asbury Stafford. His wife Mary died in
July of 1809 in Baltimore and William married Mary Lauderman two years later. 272 William
died somewhere between 1823 and 1830, probably in Baltimore. 273
Captain W. S. Stafford had gone out to sea early in the War of 1812 and went directly for
the Spanish and Portuguese Coast. 274 With little success, Captain Stafford was about to change
his course when on January 25, 1813, in the sight of Cape St. Vincent, a sail was spotted and the
Dolphin gave chase. 275 Soon after, another sail was spotted and the privateer overtook the ships
and heavy action began. 276 In a short time, both vessels were surrendered, the larger one being
the Hebe, carrying 16 guns and 25 men, and the smaller vessel, the brig Three Brothers, with 10
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guns and 25 men. 277 The Dolphin carried 10 guns and a 60-man crew, and only 4 of them were
injured. Captain Stafford placed prize crews in the vessels and sailed toward the United States. 278
The Hebe was recaptured but the Three Brothers made it to New York. 279 Both ships
were coming from Malta and had valuable cargo onboard. Captain Brigham of the Hebe declared
that after a severe contest, he wanted to make public and gratefully acknowledge the kind and
human treatment he and his crew experienced on board the Dolphin. 280 He hoped that because
of the tender sympathy and goodness of Captain Stafford, if he were ever in the hands of the
British, he would be treated with similar treatment and respect. 281
On April 3, 1813 Sir John Warren, had 6 heavily armed ships and appeared off the
Rappahannock River, where four American privateers, the Arab, Lynx, Racer, and Dolphin,
happened to be. 282 The British sent 17 boats with a large force of men against them. They were
able to attack them separately, and selected the Arab first and made for her, but her captain did
not give her up so easily; both sides sustained heavy losses in the struggle. 283 After the Arab
debacle, the British made for the Lynx, who after watching the casualties gave up without much
resistance. 284 The same went for the Racer. Now only the Dolphin remained, and she would not
go down easily. 285 “For two hours, Captain Stafford responded gallantly, but in the final boat
attack he was compelled to surrender.” 286 In the struggle, the British admit a loss of two killed
and eleven wounded, but according to American reports, the enemy had fifty killed or
277

Id.
Id.
279
Id. at 466.
280
Id.
281
Id.
282
Id.
283
Id.
284
Id.
285
Id.
286
Id.
278

38

wounded. 287 Captain Stafford placed his losses at six killed and ten wounded. The Dolphin,
along with the Racer and Lynx, was taken under British command. In consideration of his
treatment of the crew of the Hebe, Captain Stafford was cordially received by Sir John Warren,
and in a few days was released and sent to Baltimore. 288
George Coggeshall knew Stafford personally and described him as a modest and
unassuming man. 289 Coggeshall said, “No one can for a moment doubt his unflinching bravery
and gallant bearing when he reflects on the many battles he has gained over the enemies of his
country.” 290 The Dolphin had taken eleven British vessels; one of the prizes was burned at sea
and another was recaptured, while the others—including the schooner Fanny, valued at 18
thousand dollars were brought into port. 291 On November 27, 1813, Captain Stafford, while in
the command of another privateer, was attacked while off Charleston by five British boats. 292
One of the boats was torn to pieces by the privateer, and the others retreated after heavy
losses. 293 It is obvious from his bravery that Captain Stafford commanded the respect from all
men who knew him.
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